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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the importance of the credit channel in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Tunisia. Using a VAR approach, we attempt to empirically examine the responses of the main 
aggregates of the Tunisian economy to monetary policy shocks over the period 1965-2015. Our empirical results 
showed that credit has a significant effect on investment and inflation. Indeed, the cointegration relationship, 
coupled with the weak exogeneity test, shows that credit is an endogenous variable and therefore the long-term 
equation found is a credit equation. The crucial role of credit channel is argued by the goal of price stability 
expected by any monetary policy. The analysis of monetary shocks shows the importance of exchange rate 
policy and the local currency devaluation on the financing mode. It is observed that Tunisian economy is 
dominated by external conditions. This dominance is confirmed by extensive using of external debts and trade 
agreements with the dominant countries. Ultimately, our findings suggest that policymakers should act on the 
level of economic activity and inflation, on two terms. The first is in short-run, by acting on the interest rate and 
the second is in long-run, by controlling the exchange rate. 
Keywords: Credit channel, monetary policy transmission, VAR approach, impulse analysis, monetary shocks 
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Introduction 
The monetary policy transmission channels have been changed with the reforms and deregulation within the 
policy of monetary and financial liberalization that has been emerged since the late 1980s in most countries. If 
the interest rate channel now seems more direct, the effect of the monetary aggregates themselves on economic 
activity may have changed as their definitions evolved. This definition has undergone several modifications 
depending on the physical quality of the currency (degree of liquidity, maturity, immaterialization) and the 
theoretical view associated with money itself. In parallel, in the recent recession of United States that began in 
December 2007 and ended in June 2009, kept  interest rates at very low levels  have failed to revive economic 
 activity in usual delays, because the distribution of credits has been inefficient (Barran, Coudert and Mojon, 
1995). This has cast some doubts on the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. To the interest rates 
channel, some authors have proposed to add a bank credit channel (e.g. Stephen and Glenn, 1996; Mishkin, 
2011; White, 2009). 
     If it is now theoretically established that credit rationing may exist, the balancing of this market may involve 
variables other than the interest rate. Moreover, this rationing, generally carried out by banks during the 
recession periods, may certainly  have a macroeconomic impacts that deserve to be studied. If bank credit is not 
perfectly substitutable for other financing sources - this is the case for small firms that do not have access to 
other financing sources - the rationing constraint may have a restrictive effect on demand for goods and also on 
supply. The work initiated by Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992) in the United States raised the issue of 
monetary policy transmission specific to bank credit. To the interest rates channel and the money demand, we 
would add a credit banking channel. This latter would regroup the specific effects resulting from the 
repercussions of monetary policy on bank credit. We can therefore consider the mechanisms of 'financial 
propagation', resulting from the fact that a shock on monetary policy can affect the wealth of firms and thus their 
access to the main financing resource. 
     Our objective in this paper is to demonstrate the importance of the credit channel in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in Tunisia. Using a VAR approach, we attempt to empirically examine the responses of 
the main aggregates of the Tunisian economy to monetary policy shocks over the period 1965-2015. Especially, 
our exercise consists to simulate the reaction functions of the different variables and the variance decomposition 
for the different series. In this context, we are concerned with the dynamics of economic activity and inflation in 
a bank credit model. 
3 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of the credit channel 
in IS-LM model. Section 3 describes the methodology based on credit channel modeling. Section 4 discusses the 
results of co-integration, causality and the response functions of the selected variables to monetary shocks. 
Section 5 concludes and gives annotations on our future work. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The transmission by the credit channel has been the subject of an abundant empirical literature since the 1980s, 
where the various authors have noted the weakness of the traditional relations of the money view and attempted 
to demonstrate the specific role of bank credit (see inter alia; Lavoie 1984; Natke 1998; Eric Berr 1999; Rochon 
1999; Mathias 2005; Ferreria 2009; Mishkin 2011). But their foundations do not form a truly unified theoretical 
corpus and the microeconomic explanations evoked may differ from one author to another. The approach is 
common to recognize the importance of banking assets, and therefore the credit, in the monetary policy 
transmission.  
     According to Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1995), the non-neutrality of money can result from the 
transmission by credit channel. The real effect of a monetary restriction can be reinforced by the decline in 
credit. Some businesses that do not have access to other forms of external financing are forced to reduce their 
investment. 
The credit channel in IS-LM model 
Although the IS-LM model now seems outdated compared to the theoretical developments that followed it, the 
interpretation of the effects of monetary policy it proposes still serves as a reference. In the basic model, bank 
credit is not identified in its nominal term. There is only one financing source (bonds), which implicitly amounts 
to assuming perfect substitutability between securities and credit. 
     In the case of monetary tightening or contraction of bank reserves, banks may react by increasing their 
requests for deposits not subject to compulsory reserves, certificates of deposit or term deposits, or well, possibly 
through the issuance of titles which leading to an increase in interest rates. This increase, by reducing 
investment, has a real effect. In this context, the behavior of banks, in response to an inflexion of monetary 
policy, therefore concerns only their liabilities. The asset composition does not appear to be affected. This 
hypothesis is called into question in the credit channel.  
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Two reasons could be causing that transmission by 'money channel’ is less and less effective. First, a large 
proportion of bank deposits is today paid to the money market rates, which makes traditional substitutions 
between money and securities less likely. Second,  the compulsory reserves on deposits tend to decrease or even 
disappear, in the majority of developed countries, which certainly makes the banks less attentive to managing 
their liabilities to avoid them. 
     Blinder (1987) showed the consequences of credit rationing on an IS-LM model. He highlighted the real 
effects of the transition from the economy to a rationing stance and the resulting growth regimes. Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) have incorporated, to the stock market, a bank credit market in IS-LM model, and suggest that the 
standard results have been greatly affected because shocks in the credit supply can lead to divergent effects on 
both interest rates. Notably, a shock reducing the credit supply, resulting for example from a rise in the risk on 
bank borrowers, can reduce credit, national income and the rate on government bonds whereas the credit rate 
rises.  
Bank credit and monetary policy transmission 
The monetary policy transmission study has oriented academic research towards the credit channel. This channel 
concerns all the implications that the variations of key rates can react on the credit supply. The economic 
literature makes a distinction between two types of channels. The first channel is the strict bank credit channel – 
the key rate changes modify the refinancing conditions of the banks in the money and financial markets. In 
particular, a tightening of the conditions of banks refinancing weighs on their activity of monetary creation, on 
their production of credit to the economy and therefore on the business investment and households consumption 
–. The model of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) showed that, by reducing the banks access to lendable funds, open 
market operations limit the supply of bank loans. 
     The second channel is the broad channel of credit or balance sheet channel - as in the theory of the financial 
accelerator, the quality household’s balance sheet structure is considered, but assuming nominal policy shock 
rather than real shocks on the external finance premium. A change in interest rates thus affects the structure of 
the balance sheets, hence the external finance premium. An increase in rates will then have significantly greater 
depressive effects when private agents are already heavily indebted and poorly solvent –. 
Thus, the unfavorable impact of a monetary tightening on the ability of companies to repay their debts (the 
interest rate channel) and the cost of their capital (Q of Tobin) is reinforced by a recovery in the risk premium 
which banks are weighing on new borrowers. Behaviors in financial markets linked to a change in risk may 
accentuate the effects on monetary policy stances. 
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Since its introduction in the literature in the mid-1980s, the credit channel has been the subject of intense 
controversy. Several empirical studies (e.g. Stephen and Glenn 1996; Jordan 1999; Kalt 2001; Natal 2003; 
Ferreira 2009; Ioannidou et al. 2009) have sought to assess its importance in relation to other channels of 
monetary policy transmission (i.e. interest rate channel, exchange rate channel). 
     According to Curdia and Woodford (2010), the existence of the credit channel involves some conditions. 
First, companies’ dependence on credit (in the case of the broad channel) and more particularly bank credit (in 
the case of the narrow channel). This implies an imperfect substitutability between titles and credits. Second, the 
banks are sensitive to their conditions of refinancing with the Central Bank and that they have little alternative 
possibilities of refinancing markets. Third, the activity of the banks is mainly oriented to the credit and 
contributes little to the economy by other types of receivables financing. 
     However, the acceleration of financial innovations and the concomitant development of capital markets, since 
the mid-1980s, have led many authors to believe that a movement of banking disintermediation of financing took 
place and followed many attempts of questioning of the credit channel (see Smant 2002). 
     Admittedly, the emergence of capital markets has offered companies a wider range of financing substitutes 
for bank credit. On their side, banks have had to adapt to this boom. They have, at the same time diversified their 
sources of financing (deposits and market resources) and their assets (credit and securities). 
 
Pos-Keynesian credit model 
Certainly, effective demand plays a central role in economic thought. Keynes (1936) said that if the propensity to 
consume and the investment rate give insufficient effective demand, the actual level of employment will be less 
than the supply of potentially available labor. Estenson (1992) argued that when entrepreneurs decide to produce 
more goods and services, thus they need to call for more monetary units to the banking system. Insisting on the 
chronology of operations leading to income formation, Bouvet (1996) has indicated that all contemporary 
theorists of endogenous money accept the simplified scheme shown in figure 1 which represents the necessity of 
bank credit in the economic circuit
1
. 
                                                          
1
 In this regard, see the interesting contribution of Eric Berr (1999) and the thesis of Rochon (1999). It should be 
noted that Rochon (1999) used the horizontalistic view by offering a historical overview of endogenous money 
approaches such as that of the circuit and post-Keynesians. He started with the Franco-Italian circuit school. He 
first insisted on the early writings of Minsky, Kaldor and Tobin in the 1950s and Davidson (1988) and later 
Rousseas post-Keynesians followed by the interesting deepening of Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn in the 
theory of money-credit. Rochon (1999) then compared the present post-Keynesians contemporary structural 
theory with the new Keynesian monetary thought. He developed an innovative theory of banking on the basis of 
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Following the post-Keynesian approach, we can accept the following reasoning: an increase in the credit activity 
of banks, whether consumer credit granted to individuals or loans granted to companies for projects to increase 
their production, creates an additional demand. If the economy is underemployed, this demand can be met 
immediately by an increase in production equal to the additional demand. The increase in production gives rise 
to an equivalent increase in revenues. Indeed the companies which have increased their production have 
evidently distributed the value of the additional output in the form of wages and profits. By creating ex-nihilo of 
the money by an increase of their credits, the banks create additional rights on the production. But when the 
economy is underemployed, this has the effect of increasing production and incomes. These rights are therefore 
immediately validated, that is to say they can be satisfied without any other rights already created on production 
having to be reduced. 
 
Figure 1. Necessity of Bank Credit in the Economic Circuit 
 
Our approach is inspired by the idea of Natke (1998). The latter sought to integrate the motive of financing
2
 into 
a function of demand for liquidity of the firms. He conducted a micro-econometric study of firms in Brazil to 
assess the importance of the funding motive in their liquidity demand function and its relationship to the 
transaction motive. His findings conclude that these two motifs are distinct and significant. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Keynesian uncertainty and in line with the horizontalist tradition taking into account credit restrictions, liquidity 
crisis and solvency. 
2
 Indeed, this motive is considered at the heart of the idea of the endogeneity of money and the monetization of 
production (Lavoie 1984; Rochon 1999). 
Bank 
Profit : i.I 
Credit Production Investissement 
Revenues 
Purchases 
 
Wages 
Revenues = I(1+ i) = global demand = Y = production 
X I Y = I(1+i) 
Revenue  Revenue 
I 
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     Natke (1998) used the work of Laumas (1980), which argued that the pattern of financing is more important 
in developed countries because of the liquidity lack in the public sector caused by the inefficiency of capital 
markets and major dependence on banks. To have an appropriate measure for the transaction motive, Natke 
(1998) proposed the value of sales made more than the current investment spending. The motive for financing in 
the post-Keynesian logic is introduced only when there is an increase in planned investment spending (I > 0).  
Methodology 
Credit Channel Modelling 
Specify the variables in credit channel model returns to determine the indicative variables of monetary policy 
with an explanatory and significant power in relation to an indicator of real economic activity. The central 
variable in this model is represented by domestic credit that plays a crucial role in the economy of debt. In our 
case of Tunisia, this variable is defined as the sum of net claims on the government and the lending to the 
economy. The latter consists of credit to the economy and the securities portfolios. Thus domestic credit is the 
credit in a broad sense in the financing of the economy. The credit channel model is empirically analyzed by 
several economists (e.g. Paquier 1994; Barran, Coudert and Mojon 1995; Goux 1996; Payelle 1996). 
     In order to cope with capital spending, entrepreneurs use credits. The investment amounts and sources of 
financing are mainly short-term bank credits
3
. In financing demand function, it is necessary to introduce the 
interest rate that is, in basically theoretical, linked to the behavior of the banking system and to the mechanisms 
for creating appropriations intended to cover the needs of economic activity. We propose a model-based 
specification (1) which integrates the credit indicator into a macroeconomic aggregate system. 
LSTCt = β0 + β1 LINVt + β2 MMRt + β3 RERt + β4 LPCIt + νt                 (1) 
 
With, LSTC is log Short-Term Credit, LINV is log Investments, MMR is Money Market Rate, RER is Real 
Exchange Rate; LCPI is log Consumer Price Index, and vt is the error term. The data  are sourced from the 
Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT) over the period 1965-2015. All variables are transformed in logarithms, with the 
exception of MMR and RER.  
                                                          
3
 The choice of short-term credit is justified by the importance of its proportion compared to other medium and 
long-term credits (more than 70% of total bank credit. (Statistical source: CBT). 
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     In order to carry out an impulse study and analyze the shocks, we begin by highlighting the dynamism that 
exists between the variables. The aim here is to know the order of causality between these different variables that 
is necessary in the study of the decomposition of variability forecasts. 
Highlight the dynamism 
Each production flow requires a flow of a new credit or a renewal of a former credit (Lavoie 1984; Wray 1991; 
Natke 1998). Borrowers are the cause factor, and then the banks decide whether or not to make the production 
possible. We see as well that credit creation precedes production. Without this creation, production becomes 
impossible, or at least restricted. Thus, when one has at time t, the credit for this period is for the identification of 
the anticipated investments in (t + 1) and therefore the production. In a political sense, the preferred instrument 
affecting the amount of credit granted. In addition, the exchange rate can be constituted as an intermediate target 
for monetary policy in an open economy. Therefore, the order of dynamism in the VAR analysis is as follows: 
 
 
 
However, Barran, Codert and Morjon (1995) used this order in their estimate of the credit channel. These authors 
added the money supply between the exchange rate and the credit. In our case, we have eliminated the money 
supply because it is much correlated with the credit variable, since the linear correlation coefficient between the 
aggregate LM2 (monetary aggregate in broad sense in log) and LSTC on our study period is about 0.98. Figure 1 
shows the importance of the credit volume in the economic circuit, motivated us to built a model of demand for 
credit.  
 
Results 
To check the stationary properties of variables, we use the specification of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
unit root test. This test is applied first on the level of variables, then on their first difference. Table A1 (see 
appendix) reports the results of ADF test. The results show that all series are non-stationary in level, but they are 
stationary in first difference. This implies that the series of variables may exhibit no unit root problem after one 
differentiation and then we can use these series of variables to analyze the long-run relationship. 
Graphical Analysis 
 MMR RER LSTC LPCI LINV 
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Figure 2 provides us an idea on the evolution curves of MMR, RER, LSTC, LPCI, and LINV used in our model 
(1) during the study period (1965-2015). The RER is defined as the price of the Tunisian Dinar in terms of USD. 
We can conclude an extraordinary depreciation of the RER throughout the study period. The LPCI has been 
growing steadily, reflecting the purchasing power of Tunisian citizens, which has continued to deteriorate. LSTC 
and LINV showed a positive trend despite some passing feedback. For the MMR, the statistics release significant 
peaks on the rise on the eve of the implementation of the structural adjustment plan. However, this increase is 
under control and the MMR is gradually returns to its starting level. The MMR curve reflects clearly that this 
rate is administered. 
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 Figure 2. Evolution Curves of MMR, RER, LSTC, LPCI, and LINV, 1965-2015 
 
Number of VAR lags 
From table A2 (see appendix), we noticed that two criteria of information (SC and HQ) indicated the presence of 
a single lag in our VAR model. The other criteria are considered overestimating the order of the VAR for our 
case. Therefore, we accept that our model is VAR (1) expressed as follows: 
ttt BYAY  1
 
 
Where  T
t LINVLPCILSTCRERMMRY ),,,,(
 
 is the vector of our five variables, A = (ai): the vector 
of constants of the 5 equations, which express the current variables (at time t) in function of their period lags. 
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B(bij) is the (5x5) matrix of coefficients associated with first lag variables. t  is error terms vector. Error terms
ti ,  represent the innovations that will be explored after in the impulse analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Results of cointegration tests 
The Johansen test shows, in two ways, the presence of one cointegration relation. Indeed, the Trace and Lamda-
max statistics are not significant for r = 0, but they are significant for r = 1 at the 5% level. Table A3 (see 
appendix) provides the results of these two tests. However, the cointegration relations found by the Johansen 
tests, normalized with respect to LSTC, is as follows: 
LSTCt = 5.187 – 0.029MMRt – 0.013RERt + 0.558LPCIt + 0.347LINVt                 (2) 
The general levels of prices and investment have a positive effect on the amount of credit granted. This 
relationship, which presented in Figure 3, is characterized by an enormous upward peak at the beginning of the 
period, apparently caused by the increase in inflation during the first oil crisis (1973). In addition, the coefficient 
of inflation is higher in the long-run relationship (Eq. (2)). Another peak, but less important, is observed during 
the start year of the implementation of the structural adjustment plan (1986). Afterwards, we noticed a certain 
stability that characterizes the rest of the period. 
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Figure 3. Long-term Relationship Curve 
 
Moreover, the results of the weak exogeneity test show that LSTC and LPCI variables are not weakly 
exogenous. Therefore, the other variables are weakly exogenous. Table A4 (see appendix) reports the result of 
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this test for the five selected variables of the relation (1). We can deduce the importance of credit variable 
(LSTC) and its attachment to inflation (LPCI). This result shows that Eq. (2), normalized in LSTC, is well 
accepted because the hypothesis that the variable LSTC can be considered as endogenous is accepted according 
to this test. Inflation (LPCI) is also influenced by other variables. Indeed, the monetary authorities appear to have 
two policy instruments: the interest rate (MMR) and the exchange rate (RER). This fact need to be examined by 
a causality test. 
Causality Analysis 
We adopt the VECM model under the constraint of one cointegration relation and applied the Wald causality test 
on the variables in first difference. The number of lags is that of the VAR (1). The short-term effect of the 
interest rate (MMR) on credit (LSTC) and inflation (LPCI) can be derived from this causality test (see table 1). 
The latter was highly influenced by the MMR variation, since the associated p-value is less than 1% level. The 
credit, on its part, influences only inflation in short-term. Inflation is affected also by MMR. We conclude the 
importance of a MMR instrument and the bidirectional causality between inflation and credit. 
Table1. Results of Granger Causality Test 
Dependent variable : D(MMR) 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(RER) 0.030765 1 0.8608 
D(LSTC) 2.579291 1 0.1083 
D(LPCI) 0.235134 1 0.6277 
D(LINV) 0.213319 1 0.6442 
Dependent variable : D(RER) 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(MMR) 0.200106 1 0.6546 
D(LSTC) 0.032625 1 0.8567 
D(LPCI) 0.222312 1 0.6373 
D(LINV) 1.620572 1 0.2030 
Dependent variable: D(LSTC) 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(MMR) 3.957491 1 0.0467 
D(RER) 1.426395 1 0.2324 
D(LPCI) 3.163684 1 0.0753 
D(LINV) 1.517700 1 0.2180 
Dependent variable: D(LPCI) 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(MMR) 14.80417 1 0.0001 
D(RER) 0.677022 1 0.4106 
D(LSTC) 4.159233 1 0.0414 
D(LINV) 0.931298 1 0.3345 
Dependent variable: D(LINV) 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(MMR) 0.234040 1 0.6285 
D(RER) 2.686443 1 0.1012 
D(LSTC) 0.072846 1 0.7872 
D(LPCI) 0.391211 1 0.5317 
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As already mentioned, the short-run causality test did not yield much to the interdependence between the 
considered variables of our system with the investment rate. To better refine our analysis, in the next section, we 
will examine through an impulse study the reaction functions between the different variables to monetary policy 
shocks.  
Results of Impulse Response Functions 
In this section, we attempt to simulate the reaction functions of the main aggregates to monetary policy shocks 
represented by MMR, RER and LPCI as well as the variance decomposition of the prediction error for the 
different series. Indeed, these three instruments may be controlled by the monetary authorities. The influences of 
these variables are registered by the reaction functions of the different variables following positive shocks on 
these instruments. 
     Figure (4a) presents the impulse response functions of MMR following to shocks on the above three 
indicators (MMR, RER, LPCI). We observe that MMR is self-explanatory. In the short-term, the effects of RER 
and -with a lower level- the inflation rate are negative. In the medium-, and long-term, these effects fade.  
     Figure (4b) presents the impulse response functions of RER. The effect of MMR is positive in the short-and 
medium-term. But, in the long-term, this effect begins to disappear. Similarly LPCI has a positive impact in the 
short-term. We noticed that after four years, this impact becomes significantly negative. 
     Figure (4c) presents the impulse response functions of inflation rate according to monetary indicators. We 
take care from this figure that inflation is positively affected by the MMR and negatively by the RER. 
We can conclude here that inflation increase with MMR and currency depreciation. These phenomenons are two 
faces of the economic crash. Indeed, highest interest rates can lead to real economic degradation thought the 
‘inflation channel’. This act due to the last American financial crisis which has engulfed the most developed 
economies. In its part, currency depreciation can affect local inflation by growing the importation prices for 
commodities.  
     Figure (4d) traces the impulse response functions of LSTC. The impact of MMR shock is observed to be 
negative in the short, medium and long term. Therefore, the monetary authorities can act on the volume of credit 
by their action on MMR (credit rationing policy). The inflation rate, on its part, has a negative impact in the 
short- and medium-term. This effect vanishes and becomes positive after five years. In the long-term, the credit 
reaction becomes higher. The influence of the external exchange rate influences positively in the short-term. 
However, monetary appreciation plays a restrictive role on the amount of domestic credit. 
13 
 
     For investment, there is an immediate negative effect of MMR (Figure 4e). After two years this effect 
becomes positive, grows and becomes more stable in the long-term. Similar to its effect on credit, the RER 
influences positively in the short-term, but in the medium- and long-term this effect becomes more and more 
negative. So, we note that there is certain coherence between the responses of the investment and the financing 
resources. Exchange rate policy is important in this regard. Thus, the devaluation of the local currency may have 
an adverse role on investment in the short-term, but in the long-term this effect is reversed and becomes 
profitable. 
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Figure 4. Impulse Response Functions  
 
Variance decomposition of (MMR, RER, LSTC, LPCI, LINV) 
On the variance decomposition of MMR, we observe that MMR is characterized by an important self-
explanatory power (see Table 2a). Indeed, even at 10-year horizon, the MMR yielded only 10% of its variability. 
The ceded part is captured by the credit (7.67%). This result shows that the interest rate is too much administered 
in Tunisia. In addition, it leaves a small portion of interdependence with the amount of credits granted. 
From the result of the variance decomposition, RER is also self-explained (see Table 2b). We can conclude that 
this variable is not explained by the domestic economic aggregates. The Tunisian economy is clearly dominated 
by international circumstances. Indeed, the value of local currency is a quantity which internal sizes cannot play 
a significant role in its determination.  
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     For the variance decomposition of LSTC (see Table 2c), we observe that the credit does not have the same 
attitude as the two previous variables (MMR and RER). Indeed, it ceded its explanatory power to other variables, 
notably the RER. After 10 years, the credit keeps only 50% of its explanatory power. The most important 
variable contributing to LSTC variability is RER. The latter maintains 35% of this variability. The rest is not 
large enough, is subdivided between MMR and LINV (6%, 7%, respectively). This result confirms the previous 
idea of the importance of exchange rate policy in determination of long-term internal aggregates. To these 
effects, monetary policy, on long horizons, must take into account exchange rate expectations. 
     According to the monetarists, inflation is a monetary phenomenon. This is true for our case in Tunisia. 
Indeed, in the short-, and medium-term, an important part of the variability of LPCI is caused by MMR (see 
Table 2d). In medium-, and long-term, the contribution of credit (LSTC) becomes more and more important. The 
RER receives its share of 17.5% in this long-term contribution. These three factors summarize the monetary and 
financial situation inside and outside the country.  
     The variance decomposition of LINV reflects a certain increasing contribution over time of the credit amount 
in the investment activity (see Table 2e). We observe, from this result, the utility of the credit variable in the 
determination of the volume of domestic investments. This contribution reflects the importance of the credit 
channel in the transmission of the effects of monetary policy actions through its classical instruments. 
Table 2a. Variance Decomposition of MMR 
Horizon S.E. MMR RER LSTC LPCI LINV 
1 1.000869 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 1.478666 94.64043 0.232210 4.708409 0.093045 0.325908 
3 1.796489 91.64202 0.372699 6.971937 0.090509 0.922833 
4 2.077893 91.32538 0.314322 7.112150 0.101292 1.146857 
5 2.334627 91.12522 0.268147 7.259031 0.089897 1.257703 
6 2.562531 90.83526 0.242437 7.474233 0.084597 1.363472 
7 2.770870 90.68408 0.220730 7.572442 0.082817 1.439927 
8 2.965276 90.60762 0.202237 7.618836 0.080298 1.491007 
9 3.147425 90.54973 0.187470 7.654514 0.077865 1.530422 
10 3.319186 90.51311 0.175120 7.674406 0.075874 1.561490 
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Table 2b. Variance Decomposition of RER 
Horizon S.E. MMR RER LSTC LPCI LINV 
1 5.608409 1.327843 98.67216 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 8.881208 0.748194 98.11750 0.184145 0.135399 0.814764 
3 11.88864 0.849410 97.10090 0.919685 0.130472 0.999536 
4 14.59837 0.935029 96.36012 1.613011 0.092047 0.999796 
5 17.10208 0.919427 95.68489 2.389802 0.067069 0.938809 
6 19.49789 0.885416 94.89452 3.326763 0.055506 0.837790 
7 21.82042 0.845912 94.01944 4.348650 0.058783 0.727217 
8 24.09039 0.799593 93.08754 5.414048 0.075139 0.623681 
9 26.32815 0.751227 92.10451 6.509717 0.102122 0.532424 
10 28.54610 0.703878 91.08602 7.616844 0.137992 0.455270 
 
 Table 2c. Variance Decomposition of LSTC 
Horizon S.E. MMR RER LSTC LPCI LINV 
1 0.167708 6.282025 2.540715 91.17726 0.000000 0.000000 
2 0.218248 3.734585 2.608287 90.94083 2.260370 0.455926 
3 0.234956 5.027578 2.528445 88.99350 3.030407 0.420069 
4 0.247363 6.600174 3.579454 86.30125 2.870186 0.648940 
5 0.256146 7.226630 5.936996 83.08092 2.702028 1.053430 
6 0.265527 7.653442 10.37963 77.59842 2.518687 1.849823 
7 0.279139 7.770471 16.49051 70.32104 2.392885 3.025094 
8 0.298418 7.427113 23.26735 62.55998 2.386880 4.358679 
9 0.324623 6.734136 29.71530 55.40751 2.490850 5.652213 
10 0.358067 5.870732 35.05502 49.63695 2.683072 6.754230 
 
Table 2d. Variance Decomposition of LPCI 
Horizon S.E. MMR RER LSTC LPCI LINV 
1 0.024579 16.79018 2.054930 1.445882 79.70901 0.000000 
2 0.042610 37.84844 0.689987 5.413961 56.04704 0.000576 
3 0.062907 32.52027 3.189751 22.00056 41.69807 0.591347 
4 0.086832 24.04904 6.790449 33.61361 33.97724 1.569654 
5 0.113284 18.84125 9.632517 40.31274 28.94924 2.264253 
6 0.142543 15.16805 11.95199 45.04375 25.05537 2.780845 
7 0.174257 12.41839 13.83046 48.39557 22.16002 3.195558 
8 0.207875 10.40784 15.32010 50.74900 20.00381 3.519239 
9 0.243143 8.907946 16.51400 52.47252 18.33310 3.772431 
10 0.279864 7.752954 17.48757 53.77569 17.00780 3.975991 
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Table 2e. Variance Decomposition of LINV 
Horizon S.E. MMR RER LSTC LPCI LINV 
1 0.130574 0.512907 1.154508 12.11155 0.752413 85.46862 
2 0.217999 0.340735 0.576578 17.27194 1.614962 80.19579 
3 0.299360 0.448679 0.417055 21.08573 2.330118 75.71842 
4 0.375369 0.586767 0.278586 24.22181 2.867024 72.04581 
5 0.448310 0.690403 0.207392 27.10979 3.268104 68.72431 
6 0.519678 0.751800 0.243952 29.76498 3.592181 65.64708 
7 0.590260 0.788318 0.388347 32.17198 3.863171 62.78819 
8 0.660633 0.809644 0.624273 34.35207 4.091039 60.12297 
9 0.731176 0.820227 0.931684 36.32394 4.284742 57.63941 
10 0.802086 0.823670 1.290844 38.10299 4.451143 55.33135 
 
Table 3, which based on the impulse response functions, provides a recapitulation of the role of the policy 
instruments in our empirical analysis. We thus noticed the importance of the three instruments (MMR, RER, and 
LPCI) and their short-term effects, in the case of MMR, and long-term in the case of the RER. In addition, 
Figure 5, which based on the variance decompositions, provides a recapitulation of the long-term causal 
relationships. We can conclude the usefulness of the credit channel in the determination of the volume of 
investments and its role in the transmission of the effects of monetary policy actions based on the MMR and the 
RER. Inflation, as we have already seen, is as a consequence of monetary factors and expansionary credit 
policies. 
 
 Table 3. Role of Policy Instruments 
 
Response variables 
MMR  RER  LPCI 
ST MT LT  ST MT LT  ST MT LT 
 MMR + + +  - -(*) 0  - 0 0 
 RER 0 + 0  +(*) +(*) +(*)  0 0 - 
 LPCI + +(*) +(*)  0 -(*) -(*)  + + + 
 LSTC - -(*) - 
 
+ - -(*) 
 
-(*) - 
+ 
(*) 
 LINV - + +  - + -  + +(*) +(*) 
 
Notes: ST, MT, LT denote short-, medium-, and long-term respectively, (*) denotes the importance of the 
associated effect, (0) denotes the absence of effect. 
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                                     Figure 8. Long-run Causal Relationships 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we have examined the importance of the credit channel in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy in Tunisia. Our contribution is to empirically examine the responses of the main aggregates of the 
Tunisian economy to monetary policy shocks over the period 1965-2015, using a VAR approach. 
     Our empirical results showed that credit has a significant effect on investment and inflation. Indeed, the 
cointegration relationship, coupled with the weak exogeneity test, shows that credit is an endogenous variable 
and therefore the long-term equation found is a credit equation. The crucial role of credit channel is argued by 
the goal of price stability expected by any monetary policy. The empirical analysis of monetary shocks shows 
the importance of exchange rate policy and the local currency devaluation on the financing mode. It is observed 
that the Tunisian economy is extremely dominated by external conditions. This dominance is confirmed by the 
recourse to external debts and trade agreements with the dominant countries.  
     Moreover, our policy of instrument has its effectiveness due to credit channel to overall horizons. However, 
for short horizons, the interest rate occupies the first place. For medium and long horizons, it leaves its place to 
the exchange rate. The importance of the latter reflects that the Tunisian economy is dominated by external 
conditions. This dominance is confirmed by extensive using of external debts and trade agreements with the 
dominant countries.  
     Ultimately, our findings suggest that policymakers should act on the level of economic activity and inflation, 
on two terms. The first is in short-run, by acting on the interest rate and the second is in long-run, by controlling 
the exchange rate. The latter should be stable to protect the local currency against devaluation and its hurmfull 
risks. 
 
 
RER MMR 
LSTC LPCI 
LINV 
            Strong causality 
              Weak causality 
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     In the future research it is anxious to make an empirical examination on the role of the interest rate within the 
CBT's reaction function according to the Taylor’s rule in its dynamic approach. 
 
References 
Barran,F., Coudert, V., Mojon, B. ‘‘Transmission de la politique monétaire et crédit bancaire. Une application à 
trois pays de l'OCDE’’. Revue économique 46, 2 (1995): 393-413. 
Bayangos, Veronica, B. “Does the bank credit channel of monetary policy matter in the Philippines?” available 
at www.bis.org/repofficepubl/arpresearch201003.12.pdf, 2010. 
Bernanke, B.S., Blinder, A.S. “Credit, money an aggregate demand.” American Economic Review 78, 2 (1998): 
435-439. 
Bernanke, B. S., Blinder, A.S. “The federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission.” American 
Economic Review, 82, 4 (1992): 901-921. 
Blinder, A.S. (1987). Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failures. The Economic Journal, 97 (386): 327-352. 
Bouvet, P. ‘‘Les théoriciens contemporains de la monnaie endogène : consensus et désaccords.’’ L'Actualité 
économique 72, 4 (1987): 451-470. 
Curdia, V.,  Woodford, M. “Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy.” Journal of Money Credit and Banking 42, s1 
(2010): 3-35. 
Davidson, P. “Endogenous Money, the production process and inflation analysis.” Economie Appliquée tome 4, 
1 (1988): 151-169. 
Davidson, P. “Money: Cause or Effect? Exogenous or Endogenous?” in Nell and Semmler, editors, Nicholas 
Kaldor and Mainstream Economics, 1992. 
Eric Berr. ‘‘Demande effective, monnaie et prix de production : une extension circuitiste de  la Théorie 
générale.’’ 51ème congrès de l’Association Internationale des Economistes de Langue Française, Marrakech, 
31 mai-02 juin, 1999. 
Estenson, P.S. “Keynesian Theory of the Price Level: a vector auto-regression model.” Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics 14, 4 (1992: 547-560. 
Ferreria, C. “The Credit Channel Transmission of Monetary Policy in the European Union.” WP 
08/2009/DE/UECE. 2009. 
Goux, J.F. ‘‘Le canal étroit du crédit en France (essai de vérification macro-économique, 1970-1994).’’ Revue 
d’Économie Politique 106, 4 (1996): 655-681. 
19 
 
Ioannidou, V., Ongena, S., Peydrò, J. “Monetary policy and subprime lending: a tall tale of low federal funds 
rates, hazardous loans and reduced loan spreads.” European Banking Centre Discussion Paper, No 2009-04S, 
2009. 
Jordan, T. “The information content of bank credit for forecasting output and prices: results from Switzerland.” 
Swiss National Bank, unpublished working paper, 1999. 
Kalt, D. “The credit channel as a monetary transmission mechanism: some microeconometric evidence for 
Switzerland.” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 137 (2001): 555-578. 
Keynes, J. M. “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.” London: Harcourt Brace. 1936. 
Laumas, P.S. “Some evidence of Keynes' finance motive.” Journal of Development Economics 7, 1 (1980): 123-
126. 
Lavoie, M. (1984). The endogenous Flow of Credit and the Post-Keynesian Theory of Money. Journal of 
Economic Issues 18, 3 (1984): 771-797. 
Mathias, Z. “Credit in the monetary transmission mechanism: an overview of some recent research using Swiss 
data.” Swiss National Bank Economic Studies No. 2005-1. 2005. 
Mishkin, F.S. “Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis.” NBER Working Paper No. 16755. 2011 
Natal, J.M. “The credit channel in Switzerland: empirical evidence using a (B) SVAR.” Swiss National Bank, 
unpublished working paper, 2003. 
Natke, P.A. “Keynes' finance motive and firm behavior: empirical evidence.” JPKE 20, 2 (1998): 275. 
Natke, P.A. “The firm demand for liquid assets in an inflationary environment.” Applied Economics 33, 4 
(2001): 427-436. 
Paquier, O. ‘‘Les effets de la politique monétaire sur l'activité passent-ils par le canal du crédit?’’ Revue 
française d'économie 9, 2, (1994): 71-104. 
Payelle, N. ‘‘Conditions de fonctionnement du canal du crédit et gestion des bilans bancaires: Une approche 
empirique dans le cas français.’’ Revue d’Economie Politique, 106, 4 (1996): 683-703. 
Rochon, L.P. “Credit, money and production an alternative post Keynesian approach.” Edward Elgar 
Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA. 1999. 
Smant D. “Bank Credit in the Transmission of Monetary Policy: A Critical Review of the Issues and Evidence.” 
Miméo, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 2002. 
Stephen, D.O., Glenn, D. R. “Is There a Broad Credit Channel for Monetary Policy?” Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco Economic Review, No. 1 (1996): 3-13. 
20 
 
White, W.R. “Should Monetary Policy ‘Lean or Clean’?” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper No 34. 
2009. 
Wray, L.R. “Alternatives approaches to Money and Interest Rates.” Journal of Economics Issues, 26, 4 (1991): 
1145-1178. 
 
 
Appendix  
Table A1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
Variables 
Level First difference 
ADF statistic Prob. ADF statistic Prob. 
MMR -1.291 0.626 -6.477** 0.000 
RER -1.946 0.615 -5.603** 0.000 
LSTC -2.346 0.402 -6.875** 0.000 
 LPCI -1.100 0.708 -4.211** 0.001 
LINV -1.089 0.712 -5.032** 0.000 
** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Table A2. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 Lag FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 0.612415 13.69900 13.90175 13.77419 
1 1.24e-05 2.881661 4.098154* 3.332795* 
2 1.08e-05 2.702939 4.933176 3.530019 
3 7.12e-06* 2.161963 5.405944 3.364987 
4 7.55e-06 1.973875 6.231600 3.552845 
5 8.01e-06 1.572454* 6.843923 3.527369 
Notes: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; FPE: Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information 
criterion; SC: Schwarz information criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
 
  Table A3. Determination of the Number of Cointegrating Relations  
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace statistic Prob. Lamda-Max statistic Prob. 
r= 0* 98.70169 0.0005 56.31103 0.0000 
r= 1 42.39066 0.3562 22.67050 0.2369 
 r= 2 19.72017 0.7441 9.809199 0.8497 
r= 3 9.910968 0.6486 6.278102 0.7561 
r= 4 3.632866 0.4695 3.632866 0.4695 
* indicates number of cointegration relations according to the null hypothesis. 
 
Table A4. Weak Exogeneity Test 
Variable Likelihood Statistics Deg. of freedom  Prob. 
MMR 0.719283 1 0.396379 
RER 3.158376* 1 0.075538 
LSTC 13.37786*** 1 0.000255 
LPCI 27.17474*** 1 0.000000 
LINV 1.713580 1 0.190522 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
